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This paper reviews notions related to focus and presupposition and 
addresses the hypothesis that focus triggers an existential presuppo-
sition. Presupposition projection behavior in certain examples appears 
to favor a presuppositional analysis of focus. It is argued that these 
examples are open to a different analysis using givenness theory. 
Overall, the analysis favors a weak semantics for focus not including 
an existential presupposition. 
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1 Introduction 
In my contribution to this volume of papers on notions of information structure, 
I will present notions related to focus and presupposition by working through a 
single theoretical argument, and defining the notions which are appealed to as I 
go. The argument I want to go through has to do with the possibility of 
sentences with intonational focus, such as sentence (1), introducing an 
existential presupposition. More specifically, it is about the claim that 
presupposition transformation behavior provides an argument that focus can 
contribute an existential presupposition (Geurts and van der Sandt 2004, Abusch 
2005).  
(1)     LanaF ate the leftovers. Dorit Abusch  110
The notation F represents a focus feature, as introduced in Jackendoff (1972).  
The feature is formally a syntactic one, but it functions mainly to link the 
phonology of focus which is a pitch accent or other kind of phonological 
prominence, with the semantics and pragmatics of focus.  Three options for the 
semantics of focus have particular prominence in current theoretical discussion.  
According to alternative semantics (Rooth 1985), focus in (1) introduces a set of 
“alternative” propositions which are obtained by making substitutions in the 
position of the focused phrase: 
(2)    Alternative set (a set of propositions) 
 {໌Lana ate the leftoversໍ, ໌Mona ate the leftoversໍ,໌Nina ate the 
 leftoversໍ, ໌Orna ate the leftoversໍ, …} 
In this paper, I will use the corner brackets seen in (2) as a notation for naming 
propositions.  In a semantics where sentences denote propositions, sentence (1) 
denotes the proposition ໌Lana ate the leftoversໍ. According to alternative 
semantics, it also contributes the alternative set (2).   
The second theory of focus semantics I want to talk about is a 
presuppositional one, where it is claimed that sentence (1) presupposes that 
someone ate the leftovers (Geurts and van de Sandt 2004).  We obtain the effect 
of existentially quantifying the focused position by forming the disjunction of all 
the propositions in the alternative set, as shown in (3).  The resulting proposition 
is called the focus closure of example (1).  The disjunction is true if and only if 
one of the disjuncts is true, so the focus closure is the proposition (4). 
(3)   ໌Lana ate the leftoversໍ ∨ ໌Mona ate the leftoversໍ ∨ ໌Nina ate the 
leftoversໍ ∨ ໌Orna ate the leftoversໍ ∨ …  Focus Presuppositions  111
(4)   ໌someone ate the leftoversໍ
(5) gives the general definition of focus closure, using the notation ຖC for the 
disjunction (possibly an infinite disjunction) of the propositions in a set C. 
(5)     Focus closure
ຖC, where C is the alternative set associated with the focus 
So, the presuppositional semantics for focus maintains that the focus closure is 
presupposed.  Another theory of focus semantics that uses the focus closure is 
the givenness semantics (Schwarzschild 1999).  This is the third theory of focus 
which I discuss in this paper. It is introduced in section 4. 
2 Compositional Tests for Presupposition 
What is meant by “presupposed”? Assumptions about presupposition have a 
semantic and a pragmatic part. According to compositional semantic theories of 
presupposition, the information contributed by a sentence can be viewed as 
packaged into two parts, a presupposed proposition and an asserted proposition.  
For sentence (6), the presupposed proposition is that John has some cars, and the 
asserted proposition is that the transmission on any car which John has is a 
manual transmission. The latter is stated in such a cumbersome way because one 
wants to avoid describing the asserted proposition using a sentence which itself 
has presuppositions. 
(6)   John’s  cars  have  manual  transmissions.        (ϕ in the next example) 
(7)   pres(ϕ) = ໌John has some carsໍ
  ass(ϕ) = ໌any car that John has has a manual transmissionໍDorit Abusch  112
An argument for the division into presupposition and assertion is that the 
presupposed and asserted parts are treated differently by compositional semantic 
rules. For instance, when a sentence is negated, the assertion is semantically 
negated, but the presupposed part is preserved.  As shown in (8), the negation of 
sentence (6) still has the implication that John has some cars.  
(8)     John’s cars don’t have manual transmissions. 
 pres(¬ϕ) = ໌John has some carsໍ
Compositional contexts where presuppositions are preserved are known as 
presupposition  holes (Karttunen 1973). Another hole is the if-clause of a 
conditional, as exemplified in (9). The complex sentence (9), which has the form 
if ϕψ , has the implication that John has some cars, indicating that the 
presupposition of the if-clause ϕ has been inherited by the complex sentence. 
(9)     If John’s cars have manual transmissions, I don’t want to borrow one. 
 presupposition: John has some cars. 
Together, the collection of presupposition hole contexts is the “family” of hole 
contexts. These hole contexts are used as a test for presuppositions.  If one has a 
sentence ϕ which has an implication ϕ’, and one wants to find out if ϕ’ is a 
presupposition, one plugs ϕ into a hole context in a complex sentence, and 
checks whether the implication ϕ’ is inherited by the complex sentence.  If it is, 
this is indicative of a presuppositional status of ϕ’. 
As an illustration, let’s apply the test to sentence (6). We start with the 
intuition that (6) implies that John has some cars.  To test for presuppositional 
status, we check implications of the negated sentence (8), and the if-sentence 
(9). Intuitively, both imply that John has some cars. This is considered evidence Focus Presuppositions  113
that the implication of the original sentence that John has some cars is 
presuppositional. The negation part of this procedure is known as the negation 
test for presuppositional status of an implication. The whole thing is known as 
the “family of sentences” test, referring to the family of presupposition holes. 
To apply the negation test to the focus example (1), we start with the 
observation that (1) implies that someone ate the leftovers. Then we check 
whether the negation of (1), which is (10), also has that implication. There is an 
intuition that it does, in that someone who used (10) would normally intend to 
convey that someone other than Lana had eaten the leftovers.   
(10)   LanaF didn’t eat the leftovers. 
In (11), the if-hole context is applied to (6). Intuitively, the if-sentence implies 
that John has some cars. This again counts as evidence that (6) presupposes that 
John has some cars. 
(11)    If John’s cars have manual transmissions, he must be a handy person.  
In example (12), the if-hole test is applied to the focus sentence (1).  Intuitively, 
the  if-sentence implies that someone ate the leftovers. This is evidence that 
sentence (1) has an existential presupposition. 
(12)   If  LanaF ate the leftovers, that would explain why she is nauseous. 
I should point out that the intuition that (12) implies that someone ate the 
leftovers is unstable. It is possible to make the existential implication go away 
by adding more context, as in (13). Dorit Abusch  114
(13)    A: Did anyone finish the leftovers? 
  B: I don’t know. If LanaF ate the leftovers, that would explain why she is 
        nauseous. 
There are other families of contexts where presuppositions are transformed in 
particular ways. In the conditional family, the presupposition of ϕ in a complex 
sentence which has sub-sentences ψ and ϕ is compositionally weakened to 
ass(ψ)→pres(ϕ). An example of the conditional context for ϕ is the negated 
main clause of a conditional, where the if-clause is ψ. Consider sentence (14a). 
Intuitively, it implies that if the sample was analyzed, then it was tested for 
polonium.  (This might be true because of the circumstances of a certain police 
investigation.) The if-sentence (14a) with its negated main clause has the 
constituents shown in (14b).  Sentence ϕ intuitively has the implication that 
someone tested the sample for polonium. This is the ϕ’ which is being tested for 
presuppositional status.  
To complete the test, we check our intuitions about whether the complex 
sentence has the implication (14c). It does, so this is evidence of ϕ’ being a 
presupposition of ϕ. 
(14) a.    If the sample was analyzed, it wasn’t Trevor who tested it for 
polonium. 
 b.      ψ           [the sample was analyzed] 
ϕ             [it was Trevor who tested it for polonium]
ϕ’          someone tested the sample for polonium 
 c.    ass(ψ) →ϕ ’ 
If the sample was analyzed, someone tested the sample for polonium. 
Notice that it is the combination of the if-construction and the main clause 
negation which is being used as the test context.  More precisely, since we want Focus Presuppositions  115
to indicate the position of both ψ and ϕ, the context is if ψ not ϕ.  Why not use 
the simpler  if ψϕ ?  This is tried out in (15). 
(15) a.    If the sample was analyzed, it was Trevor who tested it for polonium.    
 b.      ψ            [the sample was analyzed] 
ϕ           [it was Trevor who tested it for polonium] 
ϕ’          someone tested the sample for polonium 
 c.    ass(ψ) →ϕ ’ 
If the sample was analyzed, someone tested the sample for polonium. 
The constituent ϕ has the implication ϕ’, which we want to test for 
presuppositional status. Intuitively, the complex sentence (15a) has the 
implication (15c).  Is this evidence for presuppositional status of ϕ’? 
It isn’t, because in the context if ψϕ ,  assertions of ϕ are transformed in the 
same way.  This is illustrated in (16).  The main clause ϕ has the implication ϕ’, 
which is in fact an entailment of ass(ϕ).  The complex sentence (16a) intuitively 
has the implication ass(ψ)  →ϕ ’.  This shouldn’t lead us to the incorrect 
conclusion that ϕ’ is a presupposition of ϕ. 
(16) a.    If the sample was analyzed, Trevor tested it for polonium.    
 b.      ψ            [the sample was analyzed] 
ϕ           [Trevor tested the sample for polonium] 
ϕ’          someone tested the sample for polonium 
 c.    ass(ψ) →ϕ ’ 
If the sample was analyzed, someone tested the sample for polonium. 
This example shows that an adequate compositional test for presupposition 
involves a context where presuppositions are transformed in certain Dorit Abusch  116
characteristic ways which are distinct from the way that assertions are 
compositionally transformed.  If we nevertheless want to make an argument 
based on (15), we need to argue in an independent way that the implication 
ass(ψ) →ϕ ’ of the complex sentence is a presupposition.  
Now I would like to apply the context if ψ not ϕ to test for a focus existential 
presupposition in the focus sentence (17a). Notice that this is a pure-focus 
version of the cleft sentence (17b) which we worked with above.  So the logic 
will be parallel. 
(17) a.   TrevorF tested the sample for polonium 
  b.    It was Trevor who tested the sample for polonium. 
The test sentence is (18). 
(18)    If the sample was analyzed, TrevorF didn’t test it for polonium. 
The breakdown into constituents, which is given in (19), is parallel to (14b).  We 
start with the intuition that the constituent ϕ has an implication ϕ’ that someone 
tested the sample for polonium, and want to test whether this implication is a 
presupposition. 
(19)     ψ              [ t h e   s a m p l e   w a s   a n a l y z e d ]  
ϕ           [ T r e v o r F tested it for polonium] 
ϕ’         someone  tested  the  sample  for  polonium 
In checking intuitions about (18), we should allow for a variety of intonational 
patterns which include a lot of prominence on Trevor. This is because we want 
to consider representations where Trevor is focused, but aren’t sure what the 
optimal intonation pattern is for the sentence as a whole. For instance, in a very Focus Presuppositions  117
natural pronunciation of the cleft sentence (15a), there is prominence on 
polonium. So we should consider pronunciations of (18) where there is 
prominence on polonium, together with prominence on Trevor. 
In fact, there is reason to suspect that a B accent or topic accent would fit 
into this context (Jackendoff 1972, Büring 1997). A context which triggers topic 
accents is shown in (20). A background multiple-wh question is broken down 
into sub-questions. The sub-question who tested it for polonium triggers in the 
answer a focus accent on Trevor, and a topic accent on polonium.  Topic accent 
is arguably a sub-species of focus accent. 
(20)    (Who tested it for what radioactive element?  …
 Who tested it for radium?  …
 What about polonium? Who tested it for that?) 
 TrevorF tested it for poloniumT. 
Since sentence (18) can suggest that a number of tests were performed, there 
might be an implicit topic ‘who tested the sample for polonium’ which would 
trigger the focus/topic intonation pattern. In fact this pattern works very well in 
the positive version (21) of (18). Introspectively, the topic accent can be 
perceived as a “rising” accent, in contrast to a “falling” focus accent. 
(21)    If the sample was analyzed, TrevorF tested it for poloniumT. 
What are the results of this experiment? I have a hard time finding the intuition 
that any pronunciation of (18) with a focus accent on Trevor, or any specific 
semantic or pragmatic reading of such a pronunciation of (18), really 
presupposes that if the sample was analyzed, then someone tested it for 
polonium.  I have the intuition that sentence (18), with focus on Trevor, leaves 
open the possibility that a test of the sample might not have included a test for Dorit Abusch  118
polonium. This contrasts strongly with the cleft version (14a). If this intuition is 
correct, it indicates that focus does not trigger an existential presupposition. 
What about (21)? I think that someone who used this sentence could 
naturally be understood to be taking for granted that if the sample was analyzed, 
someone tested it for polonium. This notion of “taking for granted” is our next 
topic. But for the reason discussed above, this example is not a clear argument 
for focus existential presupposition, because in the context with an un-negated 
main clause, assertions are compositionally transformed in the same way as 
presuppositions. 
3 Common Ground Pragmatics for Presupposition 
So far, in trying to identify presuppositions of sentences and in testing whether 
focus triggers a presupposition, we have just been checking intuitions about 
“implications” of sentences. The asserted component of meaning is also an 
implication of a sentence.  We can imagine a language similar to English where 
presuppositions are components of meaning which have a special system of 
compositional semantics, but which at the end have exactly the same pragmatic 
status as assertions. This language would differ from English not in 
compositional semantics, but in the pragmatic interpretation of the semantic 
objects which compositional semantics provides. In this language, the 
compositional phenomena themselves would be the only motivation for the 
distinction between presupposition and assertion. Arguably these compositional 
phenomena are systematic enough to motivate the distinction by themselves. 
In the real English, the pragmatic interpretation of presuppositions is not 
equivalent to the pragmatic interpretation of assertions. There are unstable 
intuitions that presuppositions are somehow “taken for granted,” things the 
speaker presents as being already known by the hearer. There is an idealized Focus Presuppositions  119
theory which brings out this intuition.  In a conversation where two speakers are 
exchanging information cooperatively, a common store of shared information 
builds up.  It consists of things the speakers have agreed about.  At any point in 
the conversation, we can check whether a given proposition follows from the 
current store of common information, which is called a common ground 
(Stalnaker 1974).  This is the pragmatic interpretation of presupposition: using a 
sentence ϕ is appropriate only if the current store of shared information entails 
pres(ϕ).  
In real conversations, the common-ground constraint is often not observed.  
Suppose we don’t know each other very well at all.  After a talk, I tell you (22).  
A BlackBerry is a portable email device used in entertainment and business 
circles. By compositional criteria, that I have a BlackBerry is a presupposition of 
the second sentence in (22). According to the constraint, I should use the 
sentence only if it follows from our store of common information that I have a 
BlackBerry. In fact, before hearing (22) you knew nothing about it, and you are 
surprised to learn that I have one, since I am a linguist rather than a rapper or a 
businessman. However, my utterance is not at all perceived as inappropriate. 
(22)    I can’t contact Mark about the dinner arrangements right now. My 
BlackBerry is out of range. 
As it is used in theoretical arguments, the common-ground pragmatics for 
presupposition can be taken as an idealized theory which is useful in theorists’ 
armchair experiments. In arguing that an implication is a presupposition, 
theorists refer to intuitions about the implication tending to be taken for granted, 
in addition to applying the compositional tests I discussed above.  There are 
attempts at constructing a more realistic theory building on the common ground 
pragmatics in Stalnaker (2002) and von Fintel (2006).   Dorit Abusch  120
4 Another Analysis of the Conditional Presupposition 
Above I said that there was an intuition that (21) has a conditional 
presupposition.  The evidence is contradictory, because the negated conditional 
(18) was evidence against the hypothesis that focus triggered a presupposition.  
 In Abusch (2005), I used data similar to (21) as part of an argument for a 
pragmatic mechanism which optionally generates an existential presupposition 
for focus. (23) was my example.  Intuitively, focus here is supported by the 
assumption that the Trust Company keeps all its valuables in the vault, so that if 
Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then someone opened the vault.  
This is the conditional presupposition we experience. I treated this as evidence 
for a focus presupposition, in partial agreement with Guerts and van der Sandt 
(2004). 
(23)   If Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then sheF opened the vault. 
Now I am going to question this argument by looking at another example where 
a conditional presupposition is observed with focus. In (24), intuitively the focus 
is licensed by the same conditional assumption we saw before, namely that if 
Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company then someone opened the vault. 
(24)    Abner and Lana shouldn’t rob the Trust Company if youF already opened 
the vault. 
Unlike before, in this example the focus is not in a position where an existential 
presupposition would be locally satisfied. The focus is in the if-clause of a 
conditional, and the antecedent for the focus is in the preceding main clause.  
Before, in the discussion related to (14), we saw that the main clause of an if-
sentence is in the conditional family of presupposition transformers. But the if-
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project.  This is illustrated in (11).  This sentence has an initial if-clause, but the 
situation is the same for a version with a final if-clause as in (25).  So, a 
presupposition in an if-clause is not compositionally transformed.  Even if focus 
triggered an existential presupposition, that would not explain our intuitions 
about (24), because a presupposition pres(ϕ) of ϕ in the context ψ if ϕ is not 
transformed to ass(ψ) → pres(ϕ). 
(25)    John must be a handy person if his cars have manual transmissions. 
A minimal contrast with focus is provided by the it-cleft. In (26), a cleft is 
substituted for focus in (24). In this sentence, the cleft presupposition in the if-
clause is not satisfied by the information in the main clause, in contrast with the 
situation for focus in (24). It is in fact hard to contextualize or make sense of 
sentence (26), while it is possible to contextualize (24). 
(26)    Abner and Lana shouldn’t rob the Trust Company if it is youF who 
(already) opened the vault.   
Where does this leave us? A conditional presupposition is observed in (24). But 
it is not possible to attribute this to compositional transformation of an 
existential presupposition associated with the focus. This is indicated both by the 
contrast with (26), and by the fact that theories of presupposition projection do 
not predict conditional transformation of presuppositions in this context. So the 
conditional presupposition we see in (24) must have some other source. 
In fact it is no mystery what this source is. Lakoff (1971) pointed out that 
focus can be licensed via an entailment relation. A pure example of this is (27), 
which exploits the fact that the first clause entails that John moved the vase.  
This entailment relation results from the lexical and compositional semantics of 
the predicates carry upstairs and move. Lakoff pointed out that examples like Dorit Abusch  122
(28) exploit contextual assumptions, here the assumption (a controversial one) 
that calling someone a Republican entails insulting them. 
(27)    First John carried the vase upstairs, then MaryF moved it. 
(28)    First John called Mary a Republican, then sheF insulted himF. 
Entailment was built into a theory of focus semantics by Schwarzschild (1999) 
in his givenness semantics for focus. Restricting attention to a special case of his 
licensing condition, focus is licensed if there is an antecedent in the discourse 
which entails the focus closure. In (27) the focus closure is ໌someone moved the 
vaseໍwhich is entailed by the first clause in (27), so the focus is licensed.  The 
same story applies in (28), except that one must allow contextual assumptions to 
be used in checking entailment. 
Now let’s apply an analysis using givenness licensing to the focus example 
(23), using the if-clause as the antecedent in givenness licensing of focus. The 
focus constraint is that contextual assumptions together with the antecedent 
‘Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company’ entail that someone opened the 
vault. Equivalently, it must follow from the auxiliary assumptions that if Abner 
and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then someone opened the vault. This is 
exactly the conditional presupposition we experience. The entailment presuppo-
sition is now being derived directly in focus theory, rather than in a 
compositional account of presupposition. An advantage of this is that the 
analysis carries over to examples like (26) which are not in the conditional 
family of presupposition transformers.   
The conclusion of this argument is that we should not consider example (23) 
evidence for a focus existential presupposition, because it can be given a 
different analysis.  And overall, the data discussed in this paper favor a weak Focus Presuppositions  123
semantics for focus, not including anything as strong as an existential 
presupposition.
References 
Abusch, Dorit. 2005. Triggering from alternative sets and projection of 
pragmatic presuppositions. Manuscript, Cornell University. Distributed on 
Semantics Archive. 
Büring, Daniel. 1997. The Meaning of Topic and Focus: the 59
th Street Bridge 
Accent.  London: Routledge. 
Von Fintel, Kai. 2006. What is presupposition accommodation, again?  Invited 
paper for Ohio State Presupposition Accommodation Workshop. 
Geurts, Bart and Rob van der Sandt. 2004. Interpreting focus.  Theoretical 
Linguistics 30:1–44. 
  Jackendoff, Ray. 1972. Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Karttunen, Lauri. 1973. Presuppositions of compound sentences.  Linguistic 
Inquiry 4.2:169–193. 
Lakoff, George. 1971. Presupposition and relative well-formedness.  In Danny 
D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (eds.), Semantics: An Interdisci-
plinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology, 329–340. 
Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Rooth, Mats. 1985. Association with Focus. Doctoral Dissertation, University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst. 
Schwarzschild, Roger. 1999. GIVENness, AvoidF and other constraints on the 
placement of accent.  Natural Language Semantics 7.2:141–177. 
Stalnaker, Robert. 1974. Pragmatic presuppositions. In Milton Munitz and Peter 
Unger (eds.), Semantics and Philosophy, 197–213. New York: New York 
University Press. 
Stalnaker, Robert. 2002. Common ground. Linguistics and Philosophy 25(5–
6):701–721. Dorit Abusch  124
Dorit Abusch 
Cornell University 
Dept. of Linguistics, Morrill Hall 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, NY 14853 
USA 
da45@cornell.edu 
http://ling.cornell.edu/people/Abusch/abusch.html 